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Services in Local Hospital Markets
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Abstract
This study assesses organizational and market factors related to high-tech service differentiation in local hospital markets. 
The sample includes 1704 nonfederal, general acute hospitals in urban counties in the United States. We relate organizational 
and market factors in 2011 to service differentiation in 2013, using ordinary least squares regression. Data are compiled 
from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals, Area Resource File, and Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services. Results show that hospitals differentiate more services relative to market rivals if they are larger than the 
rival and if the hospitals are further apart geographically. Hospitals differentiate more services if they are large, teaching, and 
nonprofit or public and if they face more market competition. Hospitals differentiate fewer services from rivals if they belong 
to multihospital systems. The findings underscore the pressures that urban hospitals face to offer high-tech services despite 
the potential of high-tech services to drive hospital costs upward.
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Introduction
High health care expenditures are a chronic problem in the 
United States. The high price of large numbers of sophisti-
cated, high-technology (high-tech) services is a major con-
tributor to US health care expenditures.1,2 At the same time, 
convenient access to high-tech services improves hospital 
performance in the eyes of consumers. Controlling expendi-
tures while assuring convenient access to high-tech services 
are conflicting public policy goals. Unfettered access to high-
tech services, sometimes described more broadly as a “medi-
cal arms race,” is counter to efficient distribution of health 
care resources.3,4 It is important to identify forces that drive a 
potential “medical arms race” around high-tech services.
We analyze forces associated with high-tech service offer-
ings from the perspective of hospitals’ strategic choices 
about differentiation. Differentiation has been described as 
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What do we already know about this topic?
Unfettered hospital differentiation can contribute to escalating hospital expenditures, and past studies have identified 
several factors that are associated with higher degrees of hospital differentiation, most notably higher market 
competition.
How does your research contribute to the field?
We introduce a new measure of hospital differentiation, based on service offerings relative to each market rival, and we 
include multihospital system membership as an independent variable in our model.
What are your research’s implications towards theory, practice, or policy?
Relatively promising from the standpoint of public policy and practice is the finding that multihospital system member-
ship is associated with lower levels of differentiation, suggesting that system membership may create some counterbal-
ance to forces associated with higher differentiation of services.
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“the ability to develop the right number, type, and distribu-
tion of services, programs, and products.”5 Differentiation 
around service offerings is particularly suitable in markets in 
which customers are not price-sensitive. Many hospital mar-
kets lack price sensitivity for a variety of reasons, including 
lack of transparency of prices, payment through third-party 
insurance, and oligopolistic markets.6-8
There are many ways to differentiate hospital services. 
Hospitals can emphasize the quality of their services, their 
high levels of patient satisfaction, or their centers of excel-
lence around particular disease categories, such as women’s 
health or cardiac care. Past studies of hospital differentiation 
have measured differentiation by the quantity and mix of ser-
vices offered by a hospital.7,9,10 For example, a widely used 
taxonomy of health systems uses breadth of tertiary acute 
services, breadth of long-term/chronic care services, and 
number of community orientation activities as measures of 
differentiation.7,9,11 One study, by Luft and colleagues7 mea-
sures service offerings relative to similar “peer group” hospi-
tals. We follow the approach of Luft and colleagues7 but 
consider service offerings relative to competitor hospitals, 
rather than “peer group” hospitals. We conceptualize differ-
entiation as a difference in service offerings between a focal 
hospital and its competitors, measuring the number of ser-
vices a focal hospital offers but each of its competitors does 
not. This allows for a fine-grained measure based on dyadic 
comparisons.
Past studies have identified several factors that are associ-
ated with higher degrees of hospital differentiation, most nota-
bly higher market competition.7,8 It is important to establish 
(or not) that this finding holds in more recent times. Past stud-
ies have not included multihospital system membership in the 
analytic models. We include multihospital system member-
ship in our model. In addition, it is important to know whether 
new measures of differentiation, such as the one used here 
measuring differentiation relative to rivals, affect results.
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses
Several market and organizational characteristics can be 
expected to influence the decision to differentiate hospital 
services from those of rivals. We examine 7 of those charac-
teristics, chosen for their explanatory power as well as their 
managerial and public policy relevance. We also include 5 
control variables in our conceptual model.
First, geography plays a role in differentiation of services. 
Far distances serve as an effective geographical barrier to 
competition, sorting out real from potential competitors.12,13 
When there are no nearby competitors, hospitals do not face 
a direct competitive threat, as local residents have no choice 
but to use their services. In contrast, when hospitals are geo-
graphically close to one another, the level of competitive 
threat is more likely to be so intense that it prompts hospitals 
to differentiate services.14 For these reasons, we hypothesize 
the following:
Hypothesis 1: Hospitals differentiate more services from 
other hospitals in their market area if their location is geo-
graphically closer.
Size is a critical organizational characteristic driving an 
organization’s strategy and its outcomes.15,16 Hospitals with 
larger bed size tend to have more resources and better quality 
outcomes and thus have the ability to adapt or develop strate-
gies around their service offerings.17 Larger hospitals tend to 
offer more elective services.4 We hypothesize that larger hos-
pitals are better equipped to offer differentiating services.
Hypothesis 2: Larger hospitals differentiate more ser-
vices from other hospitals in their market area.
Size is important not only in an absolute sense; it is impor-
tant in relationships with competitors. Asymmetrical rela-
tionships between rivals exist when one organization uses its 
resources and capabilities to dominate a relationship with a 
rival.18,19 Usually the dominant firm has more resources and 
capabilities and can position itself in a way to maximize the 
capabilities that distinguish it from its competitors.20,21 We 
therefore hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 3: Hospitals with greater size relative to hos-
pitals in their market area differentiate more services from 
those hospitals.
Due to their mission to serve the public, private nonprofit 
hospitals and public hospitals may be expected to offer more 
services to consumers, ceteris paribus, which in turn means 
that they have more differentiated services.8 Nonprofit hos-
pitals can distribute any profits by providing unprofitable 
services instead of distributing profits to shareholders.22 We 
anticipate public or nonprofit ownership to result in more 
differentiation.
Hypothesis 4: Nonprofit and public hospitals differenti-
ate more services from other hospitals in their market 
area.
Hospitals that join multihospital systems with multiple 
members in a local community may have better strategic 
coordination with other members of their system in the same 
community. In this way, system members are able to avoid 
direct competition and configure their services more effec-
tively, with fewer differentiated services than hospitals with-
out membership. This is particularly true for local hospital 
clusters in urban areas.23-25 National systems with single hos-
pitals in a community would not be subject to this coordina-
tion incentive.
Hypothesis 5: Hospitals in multihospital systems differ-
entiate fewer services from other hospitals in their market 
area.
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Hospitals that are affiliated with medical schools are 
likely to need sophisticated technology to meet the training 
needs of medical schools, particularly of specialist physi-
cians. Teaching hospitals offer advanced clinical capabilities, 
care for disadvantaged urban populations, and lead in 
research and innovation, all of which increase the pressures 
for differentiation.26,27
Hypothesis 6: Teaching hospitals differentiate more ser-
vices from other hospitals in their market area.
Other characteristics of the market are likely to influence 
the degree to which hospitals differentiate their services. 
Among those pressures is market competition, which 
prompts hospitals to protect or expand their market share 
with service differentiation.3,4,8,28,29 We expect that more 
competitive markets will encourage hospitals to offer high-
tech services that their rivals do not offer.
Hypothesis 7: Hospitals under greater competitive pres-
sure differentiate more services from other hospitals in 
their market area.
We also use 5 control variables that likely affect the choice of 
differentiation as a strategy but are not of central interest in this 
study: case mix index, population density, community wealth, 
physician specialist density, and Medicare beneficiary density. 
Although we do not test hypotheses, we expect high values of 
these organizational and environmental characteristics to make 
differentiation a more feasible strategy. Markets with higher 
population density, case mix, consumer wealth, physician 
specialists, and potential consumers of specialized services 
should be more attractive locations for the strategy of high-
tech differentiation.
Methods
Sample and Data Set
In this study, the unit of analysis is a nonfederal, general 
acute hospital in an urban county, which represents the local 
market. The choice of county to define local market is less 
than ideal, as many markets for high-tech services can be 
expected to cross county boundaries. Nevertheless, the 
county can provide a first approximation of results and is 
common in the study of hospital markets.30 “Urban” is 
defined as an area located inside the United States Census 
Bureau’s “Core Based Statistical Areas” (CBSAs). The data 
on service differentiation are drawn from the 2013 American 
Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals 
file. Data on organizational characteristics and environmen-
tal factors derive from the 2011 AHA Annual Survey of 
Hospitals file and the 2011 Area Resource File, and the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The 2-year 
period between organizational and environmental factors 
and differentiation should allow time for hospitals to adjust 
their strategy of differentiation.
The data set consists of 1704 general acute hospitals, 
compared with a total of 2861 general acute hospitals in 
2013 in urban counties. There are 2 reasons for this differ-
ence. First, 809 hospitals are sole hospitals that do not exer-
cise a strategy of service differentiation because there are no 
other hospitals in their county. Second, 348 hospitals are 
reported as acute in the AHA file but as nonacute in CMS 
data files. They were excluded from the sample.
Measurement: Dependent Variable
Differentiation is measured by pairing one hospital with each 
of its potential competitors one at a time. With each pairing, 
differentiation is the number of high-tech services that a focal 
hospital has but its potential competitor does not. This mea-
surement makes it possible to understand which environmental 
pressures or organizational characteristics are associated with 
the way hospitals seek to differentiate from some hospitals, but 
not others. We include 40 services (see Table 1) reported in the 
AHA annual survey data file that require high technology, such 
as organ transplant, magnetic resonance imaging, cardiac sur-
gery, robotic surgery, to capture a wide range of services. They 
are the type of services used by hospitals in their efforts to dif-
ferentiate themselves from competitors.28,31,32
The algorithm first creates all possible pairs of hospitals in 
each county, and then counts the number of services the focal 
hospital offers that each of its potential competitors do not. 
The number of possible pairs is the number of permutations 
(P) on n hospitals located in the same county, taken 2 hospitals 
(r = 2) at a time in the following mathematical expression.33
n Pr =
n!
n r !−( )
With this approach, the number of permutations increases 
substantially with an increase in the number of pairs of hospi-
tals within the same county. For example, there are 2 permu-
tations (AB and BA) with 2 hospitals A and B in the same 
county, 6 permutations (AB, BA, BC, CB, AC, and CA) with 
3 hospitals A, B, and C, and so on. The original data in a vec-
tor form with 1704 hospitals were transformed into a new 
data set with a matrix form using the Structured Query 
Language (SQL) procedure in SAS to produce 11 264 possi-
ble pairs in which a focal hospital is paired with each of its 
competitors in the same community.
Because the permutation of a set of hospitals by definition 
is an ordered sequence, AB and BA are 2 different permuta-
tions. Within each permutation, the first hospital is treated as 
a focal one, and the second is its potential competitor. 
Services provided by these 2 hospitals are compared to iden-
tify which services the second hospital does not provide. 
These services are the ones that differentiate the focal hospi-
tal from the potential competitor. For example, suppose 
Hospital A provides services 1-7, while Hospital B offers 
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services 5-10. Then, Hospital A in permutation AB is differ-
entiated by services 1-4, and Hospital B in permutation BA is 
differentiated by services 8-10. Hospital A has a differentia-
tion score of 4 in the AB pair, and Hospital B has a differen-
tiation score of 3 in the BA pair.
The average number of differentiated services in all hos-
pital pairs in this sample is 6.58 (see Table 3), meaning that 
the average focal hospital has 6.58 services (out of the list of 
40) that other hospitals in the county do not have. A higher 
value for a focal hospital corresponds to higher differentia-
tion of the focal hospital from other hospitals in the county; 
a lower value means lower differentiation.
Measurement: Independent Variables
Geographical distance. Geographical distance is the distance 
between the focal hospital and each of its potential competi-
tors. Geographic Information System (arcGIS) is used to cal-
culate the straight line distance between pairs of hospitals.
Hospital size. Hospital size is measured as the number of 
staffed beds.
Size asymmetry. Size asymmetry is measured as a ratio of 
staffed bed size of a focal hospital to the bed size of its poten-
tial competitor.
Ownership. Ownership status is measured with 1 represent-
ing nonprofit or public, and 0 representing for-profit.
Multihospital system membership. Membership is measured 
with 0 representing no membership, and 1 representing 
membership in a multihospital system. Systems include 
local, regional, and national systems.
Teaching affiliation. Teaching hospitals are those with resi-
dency training approval by the Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Education or membership in the Council 
of Teaching Hospitals of the Association of American Medi-
cal Colleges.
Local market competition. Local market competition is mea-
sured at the county level as 1 = Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI), which is the sum of the squared proportions of each 
hospital’s admissions to total admissions within the same 
county.
Control Variables
Case mix index. A hospital’s case mix index represents the 
average diagnosis-related group (DRG) relative weight for 
that hospital. It is calculated by summing the DRG weights 
for all Medicare discharges and dividing by the number of 
discharges.
Population density. Population density is the population of the 
county in thousands divided by the area in square miles.
Community wealth. Community wealth is measured as 
income in thousands divided by the population of the county.
Physician specialist density. Specialist density is total specialist 
physicians per 1000 population in the county.
Medicare beneficiary density is the ratio of Medicare 
recipients to the county population.
Measures and sources are summarized in Table 2.
Table 1. Hospital High-Tech Services.
1. MRI
2. Diagnostic radioisotope facility
3. Optical colonoscopy
4. Full-field digital mammography
5. Multislice spiral computed tomography 64+ slice
6. Endoscopic retrograde
7. Adult diagnostic/invasive catheterization
8. Single photon emission computerized tomography
9. Adult interventional cardiac catheterization
10. Endoscopic ultrasound
11. Adult cardiac electrophysiology
12. ESWL
13. Robotic surgery
14. Adult cardiac surgery
15. IMRT
16. Ablation of Barrett’s esophagus
17. Esophageal impedance study
18. Image-guided radiation therapy
19. PET/CT
20. Shaped beam Radiation System
21. Stereotactic radiosurgery
22. PET







30. Intraoperative MRI (IMRT)
31. Pediatric card electrophysiology
32. Bone Marrow transplant services
33. Pediatric diagnostic/invasive catheterization
34. Pediatric interventional cardiac catheterization






Note. MRI = magnetic resonance imaging; ESWL = extracorporeal shock-
wave lithotripter; IMRT = intensity-modulated radiation therapy; PET = 
positron emission tomography; CT = computed tomography; EBCT = 
electron beam computed tomography; MEG = magnetoencephalography.
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Analytic Method
To test the hypotheses, an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis is used to estimate the relationship between inde-
pendent variables and the level of hospital service differen-
tiation. Variables with positively skewed distribution are 
logged. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for 
all variables are reported in Table 3. A degree of correlation 
is observed among some of the independent variables, point-
ing to a mild problem of multicollinearity, which is common 
in multiple regression studies. The highest coefficients are 
the positive correlations between bed size and power asym-
metry (.67) and between specialist density and community 
wealth (.58). A test for multicollinearity showed the largest 
variance indicator as 2.37, far less than 10, the value that 
might raise concern if exceeded.
Findings
Results of the regression analysis are displayed in Table 4. 
The probability of the fit of the whole model is .0001, indi-
cating a strong fit of the data to the model.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables (n = 11 264).
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Differentiated services 6.58 6.87 1.00  
2. Geographic distance in miles (log) 2.29 .97 −.03 1.00  
3. Power asymmetry (log) .01 1.21 .68 −.01 1.00  
4. Nonprofit/public ownership .75 .43 .20 −.07 .20 1.00  
5. Multihospital system membership .76 .42 −.01 −.03 .06 −.06 1.00  
6. Bed size (log) 5.39 .88 .50 −.13 .67 .35 .09 1.00  
7. Case mix index 1.62 .26 .40 −.16 .20 −.04 −.02 .24 1.00  
8. Teaching hospital .39 .49 .36 −.24 .31 .26 .04 .50 .28 1.00  
9. Market competition .86 .14 .02 .33 −.01 −.08 −.01 .09 .08 −.02 1.00  
10. Population density (log) .58 1.12 .05 −.04 .00 .05 .00 .19 .07 .21 .55 1.00  
11. Community wealth (log) 3.86 .19 .03 −.02 .01 .06 −.03 .08 .05 .11 .21 .44 1.00  
12. Specialist density (log) .96 .43 .08 −.21 .01 .17 .01 .23 .09 .32 .14 .50 .58 1.00  
13. Medicare beneficiary density (log) 5.23 .21 −.01 −.07 −.01 .20 .02 .10 −.14 .00 −.29 −.29 −.16 .07 1.00
Table 2. Variables, Measures, and Sources.
Variables Measures Sources
Dependent variable
 Differentiated services Number of high-tech services that a focal hospital 
provides while its potential competitor does not
AHA Annual Survey
Independent variables
 Geographic distance Log of distance in miles between focal hospital and 
its potential competitor
AHA Annual Survey; arcGeographic 
Information System
 Bed size Log of staffed beds AHA Annual Survey
 Size asymmetry Log of ratio of hospital bed size over its potential 
competitor
AHA Annual Survey
 Nonprofit/public ownership 0: no, 1: yes AHA Annual Survey
 Multihospital system membership 0: no, 1: yes AHA Annual Survey
 Teaching affiliation 0: no, 1: yes AHA Annual Survey
 Market competition 1: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) within county AHA Annual Survey
Control variables
 Case mix index Medicare case mix index Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
 Population density Log of population of county in thousands divided by 
areas in miles
Area Resource File
 Community wealth Log of per capita income in thousands within county Area Resource File
 Specialist density Log of number of physician specialists per 1000 
population
Area Resource File
 Medicare beneficiary density Log of number of Medicare beneficiaries per 1000 
population
Area Resource File
Note. AHA = American Hospital Association.
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The regression results indicate the effects of organiza-
tional characteristics and environmental pressures on ser-
vice differentiation. Of the 7 hypotheses, 6 are supported, 
as 6 variables are related to differentiation as hypothesized: 
size asymmetry, nonprofit/public ownership, multihospital 
system membership, bed size, teaching affiliation, and mar-
ket competition. However, geographic distance among hos-
pitals is positively related, rather than negatively related, to 
differentiation.
Control variables all are significantly related to differen-
tiation, with case mix, population density, specialist density, 
and Medicare beneficiary density all positively related to dif-
ferentiation, but community wealth negatively related to 
differentiation.
Discussion
The results of the empirical analysis largely support the 
conceptual model and hypothesized relationships between 
organizational and market characteristics and hospital 
high-tech service differentiation. Hospitals vary their lev-
els of high-tech service differentiation based on their rela-
tionships with rivals and their own structural characteristics, 
including their size, teaching and ownership status, and 
system membership. The positive associations of size and 
teaching affiliation with differentiation are not surprising, 
given the increased likelihood that high-tech services will 
be in demand in larger hospitals and in teaching hospitals. 
Nonprofit and public hospitals have higher incentives to 
pursue service differentiation than for-profit hospitals. 
They are more likely than for-profit hospitals to offer 
services that may not be profitable, given the secondary 
primacy of the profit motive in their strategic decision-
making (relative to for-profit hospitals). They also may 
perceive more pressure to respond to specialized consumer 
demand, given their service mission.
Relatively promising from the standpoint of public pol-
icy is the finding that system membership is associated with 
lower levels of differentiation relative to rivals. System 
members may be less pressured to attain a wide range of 
high-tech services because those services are provided by 
other system members. Hospitals that join multihospital 
systems are unlikely to add more services to their current 
portfolio if their members within the same market are will-
ing to share services with them.34 This interpretation is 
complicated by the fact that other system members may or 
may not be considered “rivals” in the traditional sense. Our 
data do not distinguish rivals that are same-system mem-
bers from rivals that are not.
The findings indicate that hospital strategic behavior 
also is associated with the hospital’s relationships with 
potential rivals, including the level of market competition. 
One dimension of these relationships is the geographic dis-
tance from rivals. We hypothesized that hospitals differen-
tiate more services from nearby hospitals. However, the 
results suggest that geographic proximity between hospi-
tals is associated with lower rather than higher service dif-
ferentiation. There are 2 interpretations for how this result 
may emerge over time: (1) rationalization of services over 
a wide geographic area or (2) imitation. Regarding the first 
interpretation, the need for a specific high-tech service 
increases if a focal hospital is distant from other hospitals 
Table 4. Parameter Estimates (Gammas) for Effects of Independent Variables on Differentiated Services (n = 11 264).
Differentiated services
 Hypothesized Actual unstandardized coefficients (standard errors)
Independent variables
 Geographic distance − 0.293 c (0.051)
 Bed size + 0.309 c (0.078)
 Size asymmetry + 3.329 c (0.049)
 Nonprofit/public ownership + 1.069 c (0.112)
 Multihospital system membership − −0.610 c (0.102)
 Teaching affiliation + 1.473 c (0.109)
 Market competition + 0.874 a (0.444)
Control variables
 Case mix index 6.940 c (0.182)
 Population density 0.061 (0.057)
 Community wealth −0.873 b (0.291)
 Specialist density 0.120 b (0.044)
 Medicare beneficiary density 0.007 a (0.002)
a: Significant at the 0.05 level
b: Significant at the 0.01 level
c: Significant at the 0.001 level
Adjusted R2 = 0.5419; F = 1110.97; P < .0001; n = 11 264
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offering that service. For example, an outlying hospital in a 
county is more likely to offer a service if it is more distant 
from a cluster of central city hospitals that already offer that 
service. Regarding imitation, nearby hospitals that compete 
with one another may imitate the differentiation strategy of 
a competitor. As all hospitals one by one continue adding 
more services over a period of time, they unintentionally 
turn the process of differentiation into a process of duplica-
tion. However, pressures for imitation are less intensive 
when hospitals are geographically far apart. The imitation 
interpretation is consistent with institutional theory in 
which hospitals tend to copy each other’s strategy35 and 
also is consistent with the medical arms race phenomenon, 
whereby hospitals compete with each other by imitation in 
the adding of new services.3,4,29
In addition, size asymmetry is associated with the deci-
sion to differentiate services. With larger bed size relative to 
a rival, hospitals usually have more resources not only in 
materials such as high-tech equipment, but also in human 
capacity with knowledge and skills to use the equipment. As 
explained by resource dependence theory, these resources 
are a source of power over other organizations.36 With these 
extra resources, larger hospitals are able to select services of 
their choice that bring more revenues and expand market 
share without fear of imitation from smaller rivals. They can 
take advantage of their dominant position to expand their 
market share with service differentiation.
From the standpoint of public policy, as noted in the intro-
duction, it is important to identify forces that drive a poten-
tial medical arms race around high-tech services. We have 
identified structural factors (size, teaching affiliation, non-
profit/public ownership, independent hospital status) and 
market relationships (market competition, size relative to 
rivals) that are associated with higher differentiation of ser-
vices. Any assessment of the public policy effects of higher 
differentiation needs to use research designs that better assess 
causality and that include information on costs, prices, and 
quality.
Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations to the present study. The use of 
county to define local market area is one important limita-
tion. More sophisticated analyses would address the different 
geographic reach of different services and different hospi-
tals, and the situation of hospitals located near county bor-
ders.37 The county provides a very rough approximation of a 
high-tech service area. Future analysis also should refine the 
measure of multihospital system membership, particularly to 
take into account the differences among local, regional, and 
national systems. Second, as noted above, the use of a cross-
sectional design constrains the understanding of causality. 
Longitudinal studies would offer a better understanding of 
the causes and effects of the strategy of service differentia-
tion.38 Hospital markets have changed substantially since 
2013, particularly with the advent of value-based purchasing 
by insurers. While many properties of the markets remain 
stable (eg, consolidation into systems, oligopoly, nonprice 
competition), the strategic choice of differentiation faces 
new market imperatives today.
Additional variables would strengthen the conceptual 
model. One market characteristic we did not include is the 
ability of hospitals to set high prices in their markets. 
Although, likely, this is associated with high market share, it 
may be a distinctive explanatory variable. Our measure of 
geographic distance could be improved by the use of travel 
time rather than straight line mileage. Finally, our high-tech 
services list was culled by the authors from the AHA list of 
services to represent perceptions in 2013. The items on our 
list would be improved if they were more comprehensive and 
mutually exclusive, weighted by volume or cost, and updated 
to realities of the new marketplace.
Conclusion
This study offers a better understanding of hospital compe-
tition in local markets where a few rivals compete for the 
same clients with similar services. By comparing a hospi-
tal’s services with each of its potential competitors one at a 
time, this study is able to better examine the complex nature 
of services differentiation. The findings underscore the 
roles of market competition, geographical proximity, and 
size asymmetry as hospitals strategize about service differ-
entiation in the effort to be a dominant player in the oli-
gopolistic market.
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